Monday, February 23, 2009
The populace of Taranto has been excited since last night, as the ship of the line Andronicus and the frigate Naumaxos made port last night. His lordship, Giovanni di' Malgiore, Captain of the Apulia regiment, together with representatives of the town's civil leadership ,reveived the two ships officially this morning. The city populace lined the docks and streets to the town barracks as the Latinikon and Nafplioton regiments marched to the barracks. Both regiments have been given three days shore leave, as well as the sailors of the ship. After that the Latinikon regiment will march by land to Bari, while the Nafplioton will reboard the Andronicus which will sail for Bari. Their no news about what the Naumaxos is going to do.
One thing is for sure, every establishment in the city, whether of good or ill repute is excited at the thought. And the provosts of the Latinikon and Nafplioton regiment, not that much.
Friday, February 20, 2009
These are all pics of my Venexias 18mm LOA war miniatures (http://www.venexiaminiatures.com/), I got from Olde Rivertowne Miniatures (http://olderivertowneminis.com/). They are painted as the Monferrato regiment of the Duke of Savoy. The painting is not my top-notch, but I am very satisfied. I used the CD "The Army of the Duchy of Savoy 1688-1713" by GianCarlo Boeri and Robert Vela, from On Military Matters(http://onmilitarymatters.com/pages/) as a reference guide.
Paints used were a mix of Vallejo and GW.They are based on 50x50mm GW squares(my basing for almost everything I have) and will be used for Beneath the Lilly Banners(http://www.leagueofaugsburg.com/shop/products.php?req=view&product_id=18). It took me 10 to 12 hours total over the period of a month, to paint the regiment. But it was worth it. This is why I love miniature painting, you take a greay lump of metal and give it life.
I have pictures with flash and ones without and it and would like input on which you prefer.
Here is how they come
And here are pics of the regiment in battle order
and of specific elements
Fortunetly some green stuff and super glue and TADAAA good as new!
My current ongoing painting is on a second Ottoman Janissary Orta for Winged Fury, and 8 Foundry Musketeers for my TYW project ( I am very near to the completion of my first 1644 Regiment/ 2 Victory without quarter regiments). On the pipe, is a Spanish LOA regiment, Morean SYW regiment, Spiahi Regiment, and Flames of War Soviet heavy mortar element.
I will keep you posted, and please have a great weekend.
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
From Morgenthau to Mearsheimer?
By Konstantinos Travlos
(Prepared for P.S. 580 Prof. John Vasquez University of Illinois at UC,2008)
How does Offensive realism, as presented by Prof. John Mearsheimer in “Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, relate to the intellectual foundations of realism put forward by Hans J. Morgenthau? This is the question I will try to answer by focusing on three elements of Mearsheimer’s theory: the concept of power and its role in international politics, the concept of uncertainty in international politics, and the question of state behavior, and look at how they relate to the work of Morgenthau. My goal is to show that, as far as these three concepts are concerned Mearsheimer essentially refines Morgenthau’s descriptions of international politics. This refinement, though, is not the only possible one of Morgenthau’s description of international relations. Other’s have done so in a different way than Mearsheimer, like Defensive realism as presented by Charles Glaser in “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism’.
Briefly put John Mearsheimer’s treatment of the three concepts is as follows. First, power is always defined as latent or actual military capability. It is a central component of security in the International System, and since all states seek security, all states seek power, which is essentially increased military capability. Power always contains an offensive element. This is the central cause of uncertainty in Mearsheimer’s theory. States, due to anarchy, are uncertain of the intentions of other states. More importantly they are uncertain on how much power is enough to make them secure from the uncertainty of the intentions of others. As a result states are power maximizers. They seek as much power as they can get. Thus states seek to control or conquer as much of the resources of military capability as they can by becoming regional hegemons, since geography in the form of the stopping power of water precludes a world hegemony.
Mearsheimer in his book argues that his theory is different from Morgenthau’s “Human Nature Realism”. His main claim is that in Morgenthau state behavior is driven by the vagaries of human nature, while in his theory by anarchy. A closer look will show whether this difference is valid. For Mearsheimer uncertainty about intentions and its corollary, uncertainty about the adequacy of power is driven by anarchy. Anarchy does not make an explicit appearance in Morgenthau. In fact motives, what we would call intentions, are early on considered unimportant by him. Morgenthau’s driving force in international relations is the will of societies to seek interests as defined by power. In his “The National Interest” Morgenthau defines the national interest as made up of a shifting periphery and a permanent core: survival. Thus both Morgenthau and Mearsheimer see states seeking survival. But they differ about the relationship of power to interests. For Morgenthau it seems tautological. For Mearsheimer power is a means to survival. For Morgenthau there is no question about uncertainty of intentions. Since survival is power every state has the same intentions; to attain as much power as possible. 
In Mearsheimer the reason states seek as much power as possible is that they are uncertain about intentions and about the adequacy of power levels to secure them from the uncertainty of others intentions. But is this difference a crucial one? If one delves deep enough into “Tragedy of Great Power politics” than it doesn’t seem so. In footnote 8 on page 414 Mearsheimer explains that the uncertainty of intentions in the international system is not caused by anarchy per se, but by the possibility of a state being motivated by non-security calculations or goals. And since the structure of the system creates only one interest, security, this possibility can only be caused in the individual or domestic level of analysis. Levels which explain international behavior for Morgenthau. Thus at its foundation Mearsheimer’s concept of uncertainty is built on the levels of analysis used by Morgenthau. Anarchy needs “human nature” to make sense.
On the question of power, both Mearsheimer and Morgenthau see power as a crucial element of international relations. Mearsheimer defines power in very tangible terms and more narrowly than Morgenthau. Morgenthau describes power as all the ways in which “man control the mind and actions of other men”. Morgenthau clearly says that power is not only military force. Power is a multifaceted phenomenon. Few of its elements are tangible; Geography, Natural Resources, the Technology and Quantity of military forces and Population. Indeed since Mearsheimer clearly does not consider intangible concepts like strategy, or governance quality, as parts of power, he commits for Morgenthau the sin of “Militarism”. And yet I would argue that Mearsheimer’s definition of power is contained in Morgenthau’s description.
Mearsheimer essentially is collapsing the tangible elements of Morgenthau’s power, into the concepts of actual and latent military capability. Military technology and quantity go into actual military capability, geography, natural resources and population into latent power. Everything else, like national morale or strategy, is made an outcome. Mearsheimer does this because a rational actor makes informed decisions based on a calculation of costs and benefits. Intangible concepts cannot be measured and calculated and thus cannot influence a rational actors decisions. Power influences decisions, and thus must be calculable. Taking into consideration that Morgenthau gives rationality to states, this refinement by Mearsheimer doesn’t seem wrong.
This leads me to the final question. Does the behavior of states, in the context of Mearsheimer’s definitions of power and the role of uncertainty, differ from the behaviors of states Morgenthau describes? Mearsheimer’s power maximizers are Morgenthau’s imperialists. Morgenthau’s Imperialists seek World Empire, Continental Empire or Local Preponderance. The only limits on which of the three goals a state will seek are balancing powers, geography and localized claims. Taking into consideration that Morgenthau himself, sees World Empire as rare and questions the relevance or certainty of balancing; only geography and localized claims really limit Imperialist powers. In Mearsheimer’s theory geography remains in the form of the stopping power of water but localized aims are subsumed by the goal of regional hegemony.
Furthermore, Morgenthau’s definitions of Continental Empire and Local preponderance are so abstract, and Mearsheimer’s definition of regional hegemony so contingent on geography, that they could easily contain each other. Thus when it comes to the behavior of states Mearsheimer and Morgenthau seem to agree. However, Morgenthau sees two other state behaviors in the international system; Status Quo and Prestige. But then, Morgenthau’s status quo powers, willing to adjust power and to protect empires or hegemonies, bear a great resemblance with Mearsheimer’s regional hegemon. It must be noted that Mearsheimer ignores prestige states. Keeping this in mind, one is hard pressed not to note the degree to which Mearsheimer’s three concepts we focused on are nestled within Morgenthau and how much they seem as a refinement of Morgenthau’s descriptions.
However this intellectual pedigree should not be seen as proof that the only possible refinement of Morgenthau is Mearsheimer’s. Defensive realism as presented by Charles Glaser, although owning more to Waltz, contains refinements of Morgenthau when it comes to the definitions of power and the behavior of states. Like Mearsheimer and Morgenthau, defensive realists see states as motivated by the quest for security. Like Mearsheimer, and unlike Morgenthau, they see this motivation as birthed by anarchy. Unlike Mearsheimer, but like Morgenthau they see military capabilities as only one element of power. Indeed this is where Defensive Realists provide a refinement of Morgenthau. What is crucial with power is not the military capabilities that are part of it, but the character of these capabilities; offensive or defensive. 
The character of power, rather than power itself, will define the intensity of the uncertainty about intentions. Here defensive realists take a number of intangible elements of Morgenthau’s description of power; quality of national forces, and leadership and together with technology give them preponderance as causal factors over the ones Mearsheimer uses. This leads them to put the security dilemma in the central position for their theory. If the defense dominates in the international system, than the worst case scenario behavior of Mearsheimer is unneeded and indeed counterproductive. States will behave like Morgenthau’s status quo states. Indeed, prudence, Morgenthau’s cardinal virtue, should guide rational state behavior. In this way states avoid the security dilemma. If one remembers Morgenthau’s talk about the perils of relying only on military power (military imperialism) and the international isolation it my lead to, the defensive realists seem to be making a similar case.
Defensive realists also accommodate and refine Morgenthau’s variation in state behavior, since they can explain Status Quo behavior through a defense dominate world, and provide an indication of where to look for explanations for Prestige oriented states and Imperialists states. That is the domestic level of analysis, once more the level of Morgenthau and interestingly the level of neoclassical realism.
In conclusion Mearsheimer seems to refine Morgenthau’s description of international politics. Defensive realists also refine some of Morgenthau’s concepts but generally are more heavily indebted to Kenneth Waltz. Mearsheimer, although making the case for a structural theory, seems far too close to Morgenthau to not raise some questions about the structural character of his theory.
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York 2001, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McGraw Hill, NY 2006
 Charles Glaser, “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism”, in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, ed John Vasquez and Colin Elman,
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, on power see pp 5,30, 56-58, 61, 133-136, on survival as goal see pp 31,33,46
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York 2001 on uncertainty pp 3,31-32,34-35, on regional hegemony see pp 35,37-40, on stopping power of water see 41,77,84,114-119
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001 pp 17-22
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McGraw Hill, NY 2006 on motives page 5, on power and interests 5,10-11,29,37,50-51
 Hans J. Morgenthau, “ Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the
 John J. Mearsheimer, 2001, pp 56,61 Hans J. Morgenthau, 2006 pp 5,10-11,29, 50-51
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
 Hans J. Morgenthau, 2006, on power and force pp 31,73, on multifaceted character pp 122-162, on “Militarism” pp 173-174
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York 2001 on actual power pp 55-56,83-87,133-135 on latent power pp 55, 61 on outcomes and argument pp 57-60
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York 2001,on power maximization pp 30-40, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McGraw Hill, NY 2006 on state behavior pp 50-51,56-59,65-74, on balance of power 173-174, 214-219
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001 on regional hegemony and stopping power of water 41,114-119, on state goals pp 46-48
 John J. Mearsheimer, 2001 pp 40-42 , Hans J. Morgenthau, 2006 pp 66-69
 John J. Mearsheimer, 2001 on the regional hegemon as a status quo power 40,234-238, Hans J. Morgenthau, 2006 pp 51-55
 Charles Glaser, “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism”, in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, ed John Vasquez and Colin Elman, Prentice Hall, N.J.,2003.pp 268-269, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McGraw Hill, NY 2006 on power and military capabilities see footnote 11
 Charles Glaser, “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism”, 2003 pp 269,270, On Morgenthau and technology, leadership and quality see footnote 11.
 Hans J. Morgenthau, 2006 pp 70-73, Charles Glaser, 2003 pp 269-270,272
 Charles Glaser, “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism”, in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, ed John Vasquez and Colin Elman,
Thursday, February 12, 2009
The Old Regiment (Lifeguard) Company Banner
Created: 1675 Uniform
Nominal Strength: 650 men
Organization: 1 battalion
Duties: Life Guard Unit, Palace guard, garrison of Mystra and its defenses.
Uniform: Old Pattern 1715 French style uniform. Officers and soldiers wear their hair in 1710s fashions. Colors are maroon red coats and stockings, with buff turn backs, vest and pants. Red cockade on hat, with golden-yellow lining.
Recruited from: Mystra, Western Lacedaemon, Messenia.
Raised in 1675, the Old Regiment was made up from a number from the convergence of small permanent Greek forces of the old Despotate army, like Voukelarioi, Saitarioi e.t.c. It served as a nucleus for field armies, and also as a cadet school for young officers. One of its companies acts as a cadet company for young would-be officers of the Principalities army. In peace time the unit acts as the police and guard of Mystra and the surrounding defenses. The regiment has showed great distinction during the War of Spanish Succession and Quadruple Alliance wars, and as a result it is permitted to keep the fashions of those wars as an honour. The colonel of the Old Guard Regiment acts also as the General in Command of all Principality units in Morea.
PS: Uniform template is from David at Not By Appointment
Monday, February 9, 2009
By Konstantinos Travlos
(written for the PS 580 class in the University of Illinois at UC, Prof. John Vasquez)
Riots, cities burning, demonstrations, inefficiency, this is what the word anarchy means for the majority of people. A quick view of the American Heritage Dictionary provides the above definition. But it also provides another. This is the absence of government authority and law. It is this second definition that instinctively comes to the mind of social scientists, especially scholars of international relations. Anarchy has been for at least 30 years at the center of some of the great debates of the study of international relations. Indeed it is one of the main assumptions of the dominant realist paradigm and of the liberal institutional theories. It is, also at the center of the critiques against realism laid out by constructivists, critical theorists and some behavioral scholars. The three main questions that are debated over international anarchy are whether it exists, what is its characteristics, and finally how it impacts on the behavior of states, organizations and people active in the international system. In this paper I take a look at the debate about anarchy between Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull as presented by Hayward R. Alker.
In his work, “The presumption of anarchy in world politics”, Alker attacks the presumption of anarchy as it is put forward in the work of neorealist and game theoretical authors. He contrasts it to the concept as presented by Hedley Bull in his book “The Anarchical Society”. Most neorealist authors and game theorists rely on the concept of international anarchy as presented by Kenneth Waltz in his book “Theory of International Politics”. This makes Alker’s piece a useful springboard to evaluate the tow concepts of anarchy.
Alker accuses the neorealist presumption of anarchy of being politically biased in favor of the current dominant Western capitalist statist system. The presumption is one of anarchy as an absence of order and law. The causes of this bias are the rationality and instrumentality assumptions, the focus of the state as the main actor of international relations and the focus on international security policy. However, the most important cause of bias is the negative value given to the concept of anarchy and the complete disregard of the historical and value context of how the concept of anarchy came about. He contrasts the neorealist treatment of anarchy to the one done by Hedley Bull.
Bull, according to Alker, after conducting a historical analysis of the evolution of the international system, argues that international anarchy is not a situation of no order or lawlessness. It is a proto-society with common interests, common values, common institutions and common rules. It has been formed from dialectic of values, ideas and arguments. What makes international anarchy different from the state system is the absence of a supranational authority that monopolizes the use of force and imposes values, decisions and so on. International Anarchy is the realm of consensus not domination. But how accurate is Alker’s picture?
When it comes to the neorealist concept of anarchy, Kenneth Waltz’s analysis seems to validate some of the criticisms of Alker but not the rationality presumption and the crucial on of a pejorative concept of anarchy. Waltz sees international anarchy as the system created by the coordinatory interaction between a precise number of functionally similar states in pursuit of similar goals, with survival been the most important, but with a variation in the amount of capabilities they have in pursing these goals. Nobody imposes these goals on states; nobody tells them what tools to use. But the sum of their interactions creates constraints on their behavior. Waltz’s states are instrumentally defined. The seek goals and they seek those goals using similar tools. Indeed what makes one state different from the other is just the variation of capability in using those tools. Waltz focuses on the security foreign policy and great powers. But it is hard to find a rationality presumption in Waltz. Waltz believes that state will behave rationally but not, I repeat, not because they are by nature rational. Indeed the most important presumption of Waltz is that states seek survival over everything else. Rationality comes from the constraints imposed on states by the international system. Rationality is thus a systemic level effect. 
More importantly it is hard to see Waltz making a pejorative case for anarchy. Waltz sees the difference of anarchy and hierarchy as being one of a functional difference among the systems units, the impact that relative difference in capabilities among the units have on the system and the impact in the difference of numbers. Anarchy for Waltz is a mechanistic process created from almost automatic interactions among units. While Waltz considers systems made up of many units less stable than those made of smaller numbers of members, the prime reason for this is not the consideration that anarchy is a bad thing or unable to produce order, but that anarchy with fewer members is more efficient in managing the crucial balance of power.
Is Alker more on the mark with Bull? Hedley Bull sees all social life as requiring order. Order is a perquisite for individuals and communities to be able to attain the Universal Primary Goals of Life, Property and Truth. Order thus is functionally conceptualized. So there is an instrumental assumption in Bull. Order can be brought about by hierarchical modes or by consensus. It can be expressed in rules or not. Bull focuses on states. The sovereignty of states is seen as the normative assumption of the system. As for Waltz, the international system is the result of interactions among states. Whether a society of states will result from this interaction is an open question. This is important, because if the system presupposes the society, and if the system is the result of interactions among states, then there is some overlap between the ideas of Waltz and Bull. There are important differences, but it does seem that the starting point is the same; states interacting.
Bull doesn’t see anarchy in a pejorative way. Alker is correct here. But that fact doesn’t mean that Bull’s international Anarchy is any friendlier to the weak or the individual than Waltz’s is. In theory, international anarchy in Bull’s conception of it, benefits individuals through preserving the sovereign state. Also the social element within it means that the consensus on common interests and values will include the views of the weak. But when Bull looks on how the institutions of international anarchy function, at least in one case it is clear that weaker members and individuals are at the mercy of stronger members. The institution is the Balance of Power.
The balance of power of Bull is a richer concept than that of Waltz. But it serves the same purpose; the preservation of the sovereign state system. A more careful reading shows that what both Waltz and Bull mean is the preservation of the independence of great powers. Waltz is quite clear about that. Bull arrives there from another angle. The Balance of power has many facets but it is only one distinction that we will focus on. The one between general and local balance of power. The general balance of power is the one that prohibits a drive for world hegemony or empire. The local balance of power protects the independence of states. But the general balance of power takes precedence over the local balance of power. The existence of the state system takes precedence over the existence of any particular state. For Bull it is the Great Powers that bear the responsibility for maintaining and managing the General Balance of Power. Great Powers are also the main benefactors of the sovereign state system. Which means that Great Powers can sacrifice weaker states in order to protect the international system from universal imperialism.
While the case is made by Bull that a Great Power could be sacrificed for the good of the system, the fact that is that this will happen only if the power place’s itself outside the system by attempting to conquer it. This is important, as a weak state can be exterminated or its sovereignty radically constrained, whether it is part of the system or not. A great power can only be exterminated if by its actions it has placed itself beyond the pale of the system. Bull neither absolutely condemns, nor condones this state of affairs. Suffice to say that it is a crucial social institution in maintaining and managing the international system.
Alker seems to have missed these points. This is understandable since he focused on the World Order problimatique of Bull. But that part is only a third of Bull’s book. When it comes to anarchy itself Waltz and Bull provide concepts that are generally either value free or benign. They even come to the same conclusions about the stability of nuclear bipolar systems (Bull 117-119). Alker is correct in noting a political bias in the anarchy concept used by neorealists and game theorists. But it is hard to trace it to Waltz. And it is hard to see a positive bias in Bull.
 The American Heritage dictionary, Fourth Edition, A Dell Book, 2007, page 31
 Hayward R. Alker, “The presumption of anarchy in world politics”, from Rediscoveries and Reformulations, Cambridge University Press. pp 356, 360-363
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society,
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, 1979
 Hayward R. Alker, “The presumption of anarchy in world politics”, from Rediscoveries and Reformulations, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp 362-363,371-372
 Hayward R. Alker, “The presumption of anarchy in world politics”, 1996 pp 375-386, especially 380-382,383,385
 Alker, 1996, pp 358-360
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, 1979, pp 40,72-73,80-81,88-98,100-101
 Kenneth Waltz,Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, 1979, pp 91,93-99
 Waltz, 1979, pp 103-106
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, 1979, pp 111-116, 121,131, 132-138,145, 162
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society,
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp8-9,13,16-18,65-66
 Hedley Bull, 2002 pp 40-41,53,
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, Columbia University Pres,
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, Columbia University Pres, New York, 2002 pp 103-104,
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, Columbia University Pres, New York, 2002 pp 103, 199-202
Sunday, February 8, 2009
These are some photos of a test miniature from Venexias War of the League of Augsburg 18mm miniatures. He represents a trooper of the Monferato Regiment of the Duke of Savoy. The miniatures are easy to paint, look good, but are a little fragile (Especially pikes or standards). My advice is to give them a coat of lightly diluted PVA glue, like we do with 1/72 palstic minis.
Saturday, February 7, 2009
Wednesday, February 4, 2009